As we tried to explain above, chaos theory is intrinsically based on the treatment of problems as non-linear dynamical system. Solutions can be complex and typically they cannot be easily extrapolated from current trends. Qualitative changes in the response and, correspondingly, in the strategy will be more typical than quantitative competition in deterrence values measured in throw weight or mega-tonnage. National security interests have to be redefined and perhaps will have to be expressed differently than budgetary numbers of large programs. Domestic economic interest might be increasingly in conflict with national security interests. Thus the notion of ``preventive diplomacy'' has to be taken seriously also by strategy planners. Many traditional areas of military power loose their role with respect to security issues whereas others increase their influence. A few years ago S. Kapitza gave a talk at Los Alamos National Laboratory where he made comparisons of the effect of nuclear weapons and national television. During the gulf war cable network news (CNN) played an important role in providing the global public with close to realtime information. Political and military decision-makers have to take this into account as a relevant factor for their decisions. It is also clear that decision makers will try to control that public information factor. This was relatively easy during the gulf war through classical means of censorship. This direct control of the news-media, however, can have non-linear effects in that the public response to that control can change political parameters which then can act back onto the military decision makers. The complexity of this public information system will increase as multiple access to CNN type information becomes more available. Under those circumstances a plain censorship decision might not lead to the desired effect but could easily achieve the opposite outcome. Thus it would be very important in future crises to build careful models incorporating those factors which were absent or much less important in classical military planning. The international drug industry represents another potentially important source conflict: The capital controlled by international drug organizations is of the same order of magnitude as some national defense budgets. Economic interests in the producing countries can often be in conflict with efficient drug policy enforcement measures. The current crisis in Peru, the most dominant producer of coca could be studied under this perspective. While sophisticated technologies are developed to intercept ICBM missiles, it seems that modern technologies have only a 50% success rate of intercepting civilian ships and small airplanes. This fact might create a ``window of vulnerability'' which could be more dramatic than that in the context of ICBM surprise attacks. Another example where nonlinear model simulations could be helpful is in reevaluating the importance of specific international aids programs for national and international security. For example a rational analysis of the amount that is spent for Israel as opposed to the amount spent to stabilize the situation in the former domain of influence of a collapsed superpower. If one superpower focuses on military strength without the corresponding economic backing, then in a system in which lobbies have traditionally had a large influence on policies there will be a very strong incentive for other powers to invest a large fraction of their defense budget for lobbying activities in that military power. For example there seems to be some evidence of more or less direct influence of the Israeli and Japanese government on US politics. Therefore it seems feasible that superpowers in the classic style might not be sustainable any longer largely because of economic and information realities. Maybe the gulf war, dominated by the US but largely financed by the allies indicated a change in the global strategic arena.